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Art and the Approval of Nature: Philosophical Reflections on Tom Roberts, Holiday 




This paper, based on a talk given at the Art Gallery of New South Wales, is presented as an 
example of philosophy done in an art gallery. Its subject is Tom Roberts’ painting Holiday 
Sketch at Coogee (1888), and as well as responding directly to the painting in the 
environment of the gallery, it draws on the author’s memories of seeing that painting in other 
times and places. It draws on these personal experiences to relate Roberts’ painting to a 
controversial idea laid out by art historian Heinrich Wölfflin, and to more recent 
conventionalist and resemblance theories of pictorial representation. It finishes by affirming 
one of Roberts’ important achievements: his discarding of inherited European ways of 
picture-making, and his place among the first generation of non-indigenous artists to 
represent the real colours of the Australian landscape. 
 
ANIMALS AND ART 
I begin with a story that will seem entirely unrelated to Roberts’ painting. It is a story that 
everyone who studies art history knows, told by Pliny the Elder in his encyclopaedic Natural 
History, compiled in the first century AD. In it, Pliny describes how Zeuxis, an ancient Greek 
artist of the fifth century BC, “represented some grapes, painted so naturally that the birds 
flew towards the spot where the picture was exhibited” (Pliny, 1857, 35.36). Similar stories 
occur throughout Pliny’s history of ancient painting, in which animals, and humans too, are 
tricked by a painter’s skill. In another, Apelles, said to be the greatest painter of ancient 
Greece, and court painter to Alexander the great, enters a competition to paint a horse. He is 
convinced that he has made the best painting. But he is also concerned that his competitors 
have rigged the competition. He therefore insists that horses take the place of human judges. 
Each of the paintings is shown to the animals, to no response, until Apelles’ painting is 
brought in, and they give an appreciative whinny, acknowledging the lifelikeness of the 
painting, and Apelles’ superiority. “A thing”, Pliny assures us, “that has always been the case 
since, whenever this test of his artistic skill has been employed” (Ibid.). The stories, of 
course, have a conventional character, and similar ones appear in the Renaissance, 
presumably inspired by Pliny. Vasari, for instance, tells that Giotto, apprenticed as a boy to 
the painter Cimabue, painted a fly on the nose of one of his master’s figures. Returning to 
work, Cimabue “set himself more than once to drive it away with his hand, thinking that it 
was real” (Vasari 1912, 94). 
But it is the stories of dumb animals giving nature’s approval to art which interest me 
here. We are naturally, and probably rightly, sceptical about whether these events really took 
place. It is not just the fact that the same story is repeated with a changing cast of artists, 
artworks and animals. Highly realistic pictures are much more common than they were in 
ancient Greece or the Renaissance. We see them not only in art, but in popular culture, 
advertising, on phones and tablets. Yet I have never seen birds fly down to peck at foodstuffs 
seen in a catalogue, on a billboard or on Instagram. A more sophisticated criticism can be 
made. Regardless of their truth, these stories tell us little about the art that they are ostensibly 
about. They show that the artists and viewers of these periods prized lifelike images of the 
world, and could be deeply impressed by trompe l’oeil. Beyond attributing this quality, they 
don’t tell us anything about artworks or artists. They don’t tell us, for example, how the 
works of Zeuxis, Apelles and Giotto differed from each other, what made them so special 
(beyond their realism), or help us imagine what they were like. 
 
STYLE AND SEEING 
At the start of his Principles of Art History, the art historian Heinrich Wölfflin tells a 
contrasting story. He describes how the nineteenth century painter Ludwig Richter went on a 
painting expedition with a group of three friends. They agreed to set their easels up in front of 
the same landscape scene and to paint it as accurately and exactingly as they could. 
[A]ll four firmly resolved not to deviate from nature by a hair’s breadth; and 
although the subject was quite the same, and each quite creditably reproduced 
what his eyes had seen, the result was four totally different pictures, as different 
from each other as the personalities of the four painters. (Wölfflin 1950, 1.) 
How could this be? Wölfflin’s conclusion is that each painter saw their subject in different 
ways. For Wölfflin this illustrated an idea that in the late nineteenth century was not 
especially controversial: that “form and colour are always apprehended differently according 
to temperament”.1 On this view – which I am sceptical of – there is no such thing as objective 
vision: we all see, or are capable of seeing, the same thing in different ways. If you want to 
know how an artist sees, you just have to look at their paintings. Individual painters have 
their own styles, because each sees things in their own way (Ibid.).2 As Wölfflin suggests, 
style was often understood as being shaped by an artist’s personality, or temperament. The 
novelist Émile Zola (a keen appreciator of the visual arts and friend of Cézanne) gave the 
idea its most vivid formulation: “a work of art is a corner of nature seen through a 
temperament” (Zola 1959, 73). As I say, I am sceptical about whether individuals actually see 
things in different ways; but even so, the idea can be useful. For even if artists don’t see 
things differently, it acknowledges something that is undoubtedly true: that artists have their 
own distinctive ways of picturing, and these can be shaped by their personality (as well as 
their many other things, such as their culture, interests and values).3 
 
<PLACE FIGURE 10 and FIGURE 11 side-by-side HERE> 
Figure 10: Tom Roberts, Holiday Sketch at Coogee (1888) 
Figure 11: Charles Conder, Coogee Bay (1888). 
 
I now turn to Tom Roberts’ Holiday Sketch at Coogee (1888). I compare it to another 
picture, in much the same way that Richter compared his painting with those of his friends. 
Roberts painted this work on an outing with another artist, his friend Charles Conder. Judging 
from their paintings, it appears that the two sat side by side painting the same view, Roberts 
working on canvas, the younger Conder painting on a rectangle piece of cardboard. Conder 
and Roberts shared the ethos of Impressionist painting, and so it is reasonable to think that as 
they painted, part of what they were trying to do was to reproduce what they experienced as 
faithfully as possible. They were, of course, Impressionists, so it is not the details of 
individual leaves, branches, rocks, clouds, and so on, that they laboured to reproduce, but the 
colour, atmosphere and effects of light with which Impressionist painters worldwide were 
famously preoccupied. 
I had last seen Roberts’ painting in London, where it was part of the exhibition, 
Australia’s Impressionists.4 There, it hung next to Conder’s painting of the same view, 
Coogee Bay (1888). (Conder’s little painting is one of the jewels of the National Gallery of 
Victoria collection in Melbourne, and so the two works are rarely on exhibition together.) As 
I have suggested, Roberts and Conder can be seen as acting out Richter’s story within the 
context of the Antipodes. Looking at the two paintings together (whether in life or in 
reproduction), we can see something credible and informative about the comparison. While 
both are avowed Impressionists at this stage of their careers, both clearly have different 
styles, and in describing those, it is hard to keep them separate from the artists’ contrasting 
personalities. Roberts’ seems more aware of concrete matter, more empirically-minded than 
Conder, subtly stressing the underlying geology and dry earth of the Australian landscape. 
Conder, who would relocate to Europe two years later where he would befriend Oscar Wilde 
and Toulouse-Lautrec, is more of an aesthete, finding delicate rhythms of shape and colour in 
the same landscape. Roberts is straightforward, more down to earth. Conder being more 
taken with Whistlerian aestheticism than Roberts, is playful, more decorative. Conder brings 
out delicate pastel colours; Robert’s palette is earthier. Conder’s landscape suggests a stage 
for a picnic, an Antipodean fête galante. Roberts’ seems an epic but beautiful stage for the 
nationalist stories he would come to tell, showing white Australians at work in the landscape. 
This comparison brings us to the heart of the distinctive value of these paintings; not 
only regarding the artists’ style and personality, but also their conceptions of landscape, 
Australian identity, and their diverging artistic destinies. But without disowning these kinds 
of insights, I want to tell another story, one that has a distinctly Plinian flavour. 
 
INSECT INVASION 
In the mid 1990s I visited the Art Gallery of New South Wales (AGNSW) for the first 
time. It was not busy, and I was able to spend a lot of time with the paintings, many of which 
I knew from Robert Hughes’ book, The Art of Australia, which I had read as a child (Hughes 
1970). I recall standing in front of a painting by Roberts. It was not Holiday Sketch at 
Coogee. Perhaps it was Sherbrooke Forest (1924), or another that is now not on display. I 
saw something hidden among the dull khaki coloured brushstrokes, similar to those 
brushstrokes which depict Australian vegetation in the foreground and background of 
Roberts’ Holiday Sketch at Coogee. Settled on the painting, and rather well-camouflaged in 
the spot it had chosen, was an insect, a native moth. Nobody else seemed to notice it. I 
remember it as being a very decent size, but it was more likely a bogong moth, which are 
only an inch or so long. Bogong moths migrate in massive numbers across South-East 
Australia in the spring. Attracted by bright lights, they can cause problems in urban areas. As 
Australian Geographic says: “daylight drives them to shelter [and] they end up blocking air 
ducts, shorting electrical circuits and invading bedrooms” (Low 2017). Josephine Touma and 
Alexandra Gregg of the AGNSW, who were present when I gave this talk to the Symposium 
in July 2017, didn’t seem at all surprised by my story, so I expect the moths continue to be 
invaders in the area. Out of all the paintings it could have settled on, this moth had selected a 
Tom Roberts painting, and it had selected a particular part of it: the part that would 
camouflage it. The painting hung in a gallery of mostly earlier colonial paintings, many of 
them landscapes whose makers had done their best to capture the qualities of the Australian 
bush. It’s a cliché of Australian painting that white artists did not successfully capture the 
colours of the Australian landscape until the Australian Impressionists. And the moth seemed 
to agree, having chosen Roberts’ painting, over the others, on which to settle. I don’t want to 
overstate what this shows. I take it that the moth did not alight there by chance. But that is not 
to say that the moth understands pictures, or even that it was fooled into taking a painting for 
a leaf, a branch or something else. What it shows is that the moth responded to the paint as it 
would to those things, while it remained unmoved by other patches of paint. What gives one 
patch of paint this power to compel a response, while another lacks it? 
<PLACE FIGURE 12 about HERE> 
Figure 12: Michael Newall and Mohan Matthen, Art Gallery of NSW, Sydney, Australia 
 
CONVENTION AND RESEMBLANCE  
I wonder if the moth can help decide between two contrasting philosophical ideas about 
how pictures work. These two ideas are conventionalism and the resemblance view.5 
Conventionalism was developed most influentially by Nelson Goodman (1968), and the 
general approach has been very popular in art history (e.g., Bryson 1983). It holds that 
pictures are a kind of symbol: their meaning is set by conventions which communities of 
picture-users have agreed upon. Nonetheless, Goodman is mindful that pictures are very 
different from symbolic literal representation as we normally think of it – signs, codes, 
words, sentences, and so on. This difference, as he sees it, is due to structural differences 
between the syntax and semantics of pictures in contrast to literal symbols as we normally 
think of them. But even factoring in the obvious differences between pictures and literal 
representations like sentences, Goodman argues that they both convey meaning in virtue of 
similar processes. For those who notice how different pictures of the same subject matter can 
be (especially across cultures), this theory can be attractive, for it suggests that pictorial styles 
can be as diverse as different languages can be. For the conventionalist, we learn to make and 
understand pictures much as we learn to use and understand language. When a child learns to 
draw, they are learning a language of drawing particular to their culture. Goodman is also 
mindful that some pictures seem ‘lifelike’ or have realism, as I will call it, while others lack 
this quality. Realistic pictures give us a frisson of recognition; they somehow feel like being 
in front of the subject matter itself. This, of course, is the quality that Pliny’s anecdotes 
respond to, and it is something that we usually see in different ways in Renaissance painting, 
Impressionism, as well as in photographic imagery. Goodman notices how these kinds of 
images are more familiar to Westerners than pictures produced in other cultures. So, he 
proposes that the effect of realism arises from habituation to a system of picture-making 
(Goodman 1968, 34–39). It is because we are habituated to these systems of representation 
that we find them realistic. By contrast, systems of representation that are new to us (mostly, 
those from cultures outside our own), seem to lack realism.  
My experience with the moth suggests to me that conventionalism is false. The moth 
responds to the painting much as it would to the khaki-coloured foliage which it represents: it 
seeks to camouflage itself amid it. But, if a picture is like a code or language that we learn, 
why would it have this effect on the moth? The moth, of course, knows no systems of 
representation, and so can’t become habituated to them. And we certainly wouldn’t expect it 
to respond to the phrase ‘khaki foliage’ by trying to hide itself amid those words. So 
conventionalism has no way to explain what made the moth behave as it did.  
That leads me to the second way of understanding pictures, which does a much better 
job of explaining this. This is the resemblance view. It holds that there are objective, real 
likenesses or resemblances between a picture and what it represents, and that pictorial 
representation depends on such resemblances. Plato (1961) took a simple version of this view 
to be right, and it was supported by the American philosopher C. S. Peirce in the nineteenth 
century (e.g. Peirce 1982–2000, 5.379). Following criticisms made by Goodman (1968, 3–5), 
the resemblance view lost popularity, but it has recently been revived and developed into 
sophisticated forms by a number of contemporary philosophers, including John Hyman 
(2006) and Catharine Abell (2010).6 It also has an obvious common-sense attraction: we 
speak of pictures being likenesses, after all. But developing and defending the resemblance 
view has proven challenging. A major question concerns the respect in which a picture is 
meant to resemble its subject. This question is trickier than it may first appear. Pictures are 
flat, marked surfaces, and the subjects they represent are usually three-dimensional scenes 
containing complex illumination and shadow. What features of such a scene could a picture 
share? Simply saying ‘shape’ and ‘colour’ is too coarse-grained an answer. So recent 
supporters of the resemblance view have identified properties such as outline shape, 
occlusion shape, and aperture colour.7 Let me put that challenge aside, to turn back to 
realism. Supporters of the resemblance view explain realism in a very different way to 
conventionalism. They usually see realism as a matter of a picture resembling its subject 
matter in a wide number of visual respects, or resembling it in particularly salient respects.8 
So, realistic pictures seem more visually like the objects they refer to than other pictures.  
The resemblance view thus allows us to see Roberts’ paintings as more realistic than 
their predecessors because their colours more accurately resemble those of the Australian 
landscape. As I have said, I think the moth’s choice lends support to the resemblance view. It 
responded to Roberts’ painting as it would respond to the trees and foliage it represents. 
Why? I think it chose to camouflage itself among Roberts’ brushstrokes because his colours 
really do resemble those of the Australian bush more than those of earlier painters. The moth 
is no philosopher, nor is it an art critic. But its choice dramatically demonstrated to me one of 
Roberts’ important achievements as an artist: he was among the first white painters to discard 
inherited European ways of picture-making, and to discover what the colours of the 
Australian landscape are really like.9 
 
NOTES 
1. Wölfflin’s own view of style accommodates this idea, but differs from it too. 
2. There are provisos here: Wölfflin would have held that this will only apply to painters who 
have all the representational tools of painting at their disposal. So it does not apply to painters 
before the High Renaissance or outside Europe, as in those cases, painters did not have the 
tools to fully and accurately register their perceptions. It would also probably not apply to 
Modern and contemporary art, since these artists do not aim to register their accurately 
perceptions.  
3. For my assessment of Wölfflin, see Newall (2015). 
4. Australia’s Impressionists, National Gallery, London, December 7, 2016 – March 26, 
2017. 
5. There are other accounts. For a survey, see Hyman and Bantinaki (2017). 
6. Contemporary resemblance theories include My own theory (Newall 2011) gives 
resemblance an important role, but understands depiction to depend on non-veridical seeing 
of the subject matter. My understanding of seeing draws on Matthen (2005).  
7. For outline shape, see Robert Hopkins, Picture, Image and Experience: A Philosophical 
Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Hopkins’ approach differs from the 
resemblance view as I described it here. He argues that depiction depends on the viewer 
experiencing a picture as resembling its subject, but that this experience typically depends on 
the presence of a real resemblance. For occlusion shape and aperture colour, see Hyman, op. 
cit. 
8. This way of understanding realism is a result of combining the resemblance view with an 
information view of realism, which holds, roughly, that the more informative a picture is, or 
the more salient that information is, the more realistic it will appear. See, e.g., Abell 
(2007).  For a survey of theories of pictorial realism, see Newall (2014). 
9. How would the moth have responded to one of Conder’s paintings of the Australian bush? 
Conder and Roberts were both Impressionists, and thus many aspects of their styles are 
similar, aiming to reproduce the appearance of the visible world. But as I have said, there are 
marked differences too. Conder tends toward pastel colours. So, would a moth be attracted to 
these colours, or insensible to them? Both seem to me possible – it is an empirical question – 
but for better or worse, not one ever likely to be resolved under experimental conditions. 
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